#CyberSpaceWar, Uncategorized

U.S. spy agencies mounted 231 offensive cyber-operations in 2011

from washingtonpost.com: U.S. intelligence services carried out 231 offensive cyber-operations
in 2011, the leading edge of a clandestine campaign that embraces the
Internet as a theater of spying, sabotage and war, according to top-secret documents obtained by The Washington Post.

That disclosure, in a classified intelligence budget provided by NSA leaker Edward Snowden,
provides new evidence that the Obama administration’s growing ranks of
cyberwarriors infiltrate and disrupt foreign computer networks. 

Additionally, under an extensive effort code-named GENIE, U.S.
computer specialists break into foreign networks so that they can be put
under surreptitious U.S. control.
Budget documents say the $652 million
project has placed “covert implants,” sophisticated malware transmitted
from far away, in computers, routers and firewalls on tens of thousands
of machines every year, with plans to expand those numbers into the
millions.

The documents provided by Snowden and interviews with
former U.S. officials describe a campaign of computer intrusions that is
far broader and more aggressive than previously understood.
The Obama administration treats all such cyber-operations as clandestine and declines to acknowledge them.

The
scope and scale of offensive operations represent an evolution in
policy, which in the past sought to preserve an international norm
against acts of aggression in cyberspace, in part because U.S. economic
and military power depend so heavily on computers.

“The policy debate has moved so that offensive options are more
prominent now,” said former deputy defense secretary William J. Lynn
III, who has not seen the budget document and was speaking generally. “I
think there’s more of a case made now that offensive cyber-options can
be an important element in deterring certain adversaries.”

Of the
231 offensive operations conducted in 2011, the budget said, nearly
three-quarters were against top-priority targets, which former officials
say includes adversaries such as Iran, Russia, China and North Korea
and activities such as nuclear proliferation.
The document provided few
other details about the operations.

Stuxnet, a computer worm reportedly developed by the United States
and Israel that destroyed Iranian nuclear centrifuges in attacks in 2009
and 2010, is often cited as the most dramatic use of a cyberweapon.
Experts said no other known cyberattacks carried out by the United
States match the physical damage inflicted in that case. 

U.S.
agencies define offensive cyber-operations as activities intended “to
manipulate, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in
computers or computer networks, or the computers and networks
themselves,” according to a presidential directive issued in October
2012.

Most offensive operations have immediate effects only on
data or the proper functioning of an adversary’s machine: slowing its
network connection, filling its screen with static or scrambling the
results of basic calculations. Any of those could have powerful effects
if they caused an adversary to botch the timing of an attack, lose
control of a computer or miscalculate locations.



U.S. intelligence services are
making routine use around the world of government-built malware that
differs little in function from the “advanced persistent threats” that U.S. officials attribute to China. The principal difference, U.S. officials told The Post, is that China steals U.S. corporate secrets for financial gain.

“The Department of Defense does engage” in computer network
exploitation, according to an e-mailed statement from an NSA spokesman,
whose agency is part of the Defense Department. “The department does
***not*** engage in economic espionage in any domain, including cyber.”

‘Millions of implants’

The administration’s cyber-operations sometimes involve what one
budget document calls “field operations” abroad, commonly with the help
of CIA operatives or clandestine military forces, “to physically place
hardware implants or software modifications.”

Much more often, an
implant is coded entirely in software by an NSA group called Tailored
Access Operations (TAO). As its name suggests, TAO builds attack tools
that are custom-fitted to their targets. 

The NSA unit’s software
engineers would rather tap into networks than individual computers
because there are usually many devices on each network. Tailored Access
Operations has software templates to break into common brands and models
of “routers, switches and firewalls from multiple product vendor
lines,” according to one document describing its work.

The
implants that TAO creates are intended to persist through software and
equipment upgrades, to copy stored data, “harvest” communications and
tunnel into other connected networks. This year TAO is working on
implants that “can identify select voice conversations of interest
within a target network and exfiltrate select cuts,”
or excerpts,
according to one budget document. In some cases, a single compromised
device opens the door to hundreds or thousands of others.

Sometimes
an implant’s purpose is to create a back door for future access. “You
pry open the window somewhere and leave it so when you come back the
owner doesn’t know it’s unlocked, but you can get back in when you want
to,” said one intelligence official, who was speaking generally about
the topic and was not privy to the budget. The official spoke on the
condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive technology.

Under U.S.
cyberdoctrine, these operations are known as “exploitation,” not
“attack,” but they are essential precursors both to attack and defense. 

By
the end of this year, GENIE is projected to control at least 85,000
implants in strategically chosen machines around the world. That is
quadruple the number — 21,252 — available in 2008, according to the U.S.
intelligence budget. 

The NSA appears to be planning a rapid
expansion of those numbers, which were limited until recently by the
need for human operators to take remote control of compromised machines.
Even with a staff of 1,870 people, GENIE made full use of only 8,448 of
the 68,975 machines with active implants in 2011. 

For GENIE’s
next phase, according to an authoritative reference document, the NSA
has brought online an automated system, code-named TURBINE, that is
capable of managing “potentially millions of implants” for intelligence
gathering “and active attack.”

‘The ROC’


When it comes time to fight the cyberwar against the best of
the NSA’s global competitors, the TAO calls in its elite operators, who
work at the agency’s Fort Meade headquarters and in regional operations
centers in Georgia, Texas, Colorado and Hawaii.
The NSA’s organizational
chart has the main office as S321. Nearly everyone calls it “the ROC,”
pronounced “rock”: the Remote Operations Center.

“To the NSA as a whole, the ROC is where the hackers live,”
said a former operator from another section who has worked closely with
the exploitation teams. “It’s basically the one-stop shop for any kind
of active operation that’s not defensive.”

Once the hackers find a
hole in an adversary’s defense, “[t]argeted systems are compromised
electronically, typically providing access to system functions as well
as data. System logs and processes are modified to cloak the intrusion,
facilitate future access, and accomplish other operational goals,”
according to a 570-page budget blueprint for what the government calls
its Consolidated Cryptologic Program, which includes the NSA.

Teams
from the FBI, the CIA and U.S. Cyber Command work alongside the ROC,
with overlapping missions and legal authorities.
So do the operators
from the NSA’s National Threat Operations Center, whose mission is
focused primarily on cyberdefense. That was Snowden’s job as a Booz
Allen Hamilton contractor, and it required him to learn the NSA’s best
hacking techniques. 

According to one key document, the ROC teams
give Cyber Command “specific target related technical and operational
material (identification/recognition), tools and techniques that allow
the employment of U.S. national and tactical specific computer network
attack mechanisms.”

The intelligence community’s cybermissions
include defense of military and other classified computer networks
against foreign attack, a task that absorbs roughly one-third of a total
cyber operations budget of $1.02 billion in fiscal 2013, according to
the Cryptologic Program budget. The ROC’s breaking-and-entering mission,
supported by the GENIE infrastructure, spends nearly twice as much:
$651.7 million.

Most GENIE operations aim for “exploitation” of
foreign systems, a term defined in the intelligence budget summary as
“surreptitious virtual or physical access to create and sustain a
presence inside targeted systems or facilities.” The document adds:
“System logs and processes are modified to cloak the intrusion,
facilitate future access, and accomplish other operational goals.” 

The
NSA designs most of its own implants, but it devoted $25.1 million this
year to “additional covert purchases of software vulnerabilities” from
private malware vendors, a growing gray-market industry based largely in
Europe.

‘Most challenging targets’

The budget documents cast U.S. attacks as integral to cyberdefense — describing them in some cases as “active defense.” 

“If
you’re neutralizing someone’s nuclear command and control, that’s a
huge attack,” said one former defense official. The greater the physical
effect, officials said, the less likely it is that an intrusion can
remain hidden. 

“The United States is moving toward the use of tools short of
traditional weapons that are unattributable — that cannot be easily tied
to the attacker — to convince an adversary to change their behavior at a
strategic level,”
said another former senior U.S. official, who also
spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive operations.

China and Russia are regarded as the most formidable
cyberthreats
, and it is not always easy to tell who works for whom.
China’s offensive operations are centered in the Technical
Reconnaissance Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army, but U.S.
intelligence has come to believe that those state-employed hackers by
day return to work at night for personal profit, stealing valuable U.S.
defense industry secrets and selling them.

Iran is a distant third in capability but is thought to be more
strongly motivated to retaliate for Stuxnet with an operation that would
not only steal information but erase it and attempt to damage U.S.
hardware.

The “most challenging targets” to penetrate are the same
in cyber-operations as for all other forms of data collection described
in the intelligence budget: Iran, North Korea, China and Russia. GENIE
and ROC operators place special focus on locating suspected terrorists
“in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Iraq, Somalia, and other extremist
safe havens,” according to one list of priorities. 

The growth of
Tailored Access Operations at the NSA has been accompanied by a major
expansion of the CIA’s Information Operations Center, or IOC. 

The
CIA unit employs hundreds of people at facilities in Northern Virginia
and has become one of the CIA’s largest divisions. Its primary focus has
shifted in recent years from counterterrorism to cybersecurity,
according to the budget document.

The military’s cyber-operations,
including U.S. Cyber Command, have drawn much of the public’s
attention, but the IOC undertakes some of the most notable offensive
operations, including the recruitment of several new intelligence
sources, the document said.

That fact has rankled military
cyber-operations personnel who grouse that the actions they can take are
constrained by the legal authorities that govern them. The presidential
policy directive on cyber-operations issued in October made clear that
military cyber-operations that result in the disruption or destruction
or even manipulation of computers must be approved by the president. But
the directive, first reported last fall by The Post and then leaked in
June by Snowden, largely does not apply to the intelligence community.

Given
the “vast volumes of data” pulled in by the NSA, storage has become a
pressing question. The NSA is nearing completion of a massive new data
center in Utah. A second one will be built at Fort Meade “to keep pace
with cyber processing demands,”
the budget document said.

According
to the document, a high-performance computing center in Utah will
manage “storage, analysis, and intelligence production.” This will allow
intelligence agencies “to evaluate similarities among intrusions that
could indicate the presence of a coordinated cyber attack, whether from
an organized criminal enterprise or a nation-state.”

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